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I
n this issue, Crawford et al. describe their experiences 
running a clinical diagnostic laboratory during the ﬁ  rst 3 
weeks of the inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak 
(1). During the early weeks of the outbreak, their labora-
tory, which serves 15 hospitals and afﬁ  liated physician 
practices in the greater New York City metropolitan area, 
experienced an ≈8× increase in respiratory virus testing, 
reaching a maximum of about 900 samples processed in 
1 day. 
As part of their outbreak response, the laboratory in-
creased weekly work hours by ≈60% and doubled week-
end work hours. Physical laboratory space was also rapidly 
expanded. Equally important to the response plan were 2 
decisions to alter testing protocols: cultures were screened 
1 time rather than 3, and the use of the Luminex xTAG Re-
spiratory Virus Panel assay (Luminex Molecular Diagnos-
tics, Toronto, Ontario, Canada) was prioritized for testing 
specimens from hospitalized patients.
The missions of clinical laboratories and public health 
laboratories (PHL) differ markedly. Clinical laboratories 
have the primary (almost sole) responsibility of testing 
samples to aid clinical decision-making. Although PHLs 
also test samples to aid clinical decisions, functions like 
surveillance, strain identiﬁ  cation, and tracking of drug re-
sistance are arguably their main priorities. Clinical labora-
tories often have resources available that allow for rapid 
expansion, but PHLs typically work on ﬁ  xed budgets that 
have little ﬂ  exibility despite unpredictable changes in de-
mand for services.
In their article, Crawford et al. (1) discuss many les-
sons they learned that have universal application for all 
laboratories engaged in inﬂ  uenza surge response planning. 
First and foremost was that they had an established plan to 
deal with such an emergency. Equally important, the labo-
ratory leadership understood the plan and how to adapt it 
to the speciﬁ  c situation at hand. The leadership also was 
willing to prioritize testing and triage the ﬂ  ow of samples. 
The laboratory’s ability to adapt rapidly was limited most 
notably by the number of suitably trained and experienced 
staff who could be brought in to provide surge capacity as-
sistance. To be useful, emergency plans must be more than 
mere documents; they must be rooted in an adequate as-
sessment of capacity and a realistic understanding of the 
degree to which capacity can be increased rapidly.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has 
developed a software tool called FluLabSurge (http://
www.cdc.gov/ﬂ  u/tools/ﬂ  ulabsurge), which is designed to 
assist laboratory directors in planning for a surge in de-
mand for testing. Each laboratory has unique operating 
characteristics. However, by using FluLabSurge, we de-
termined that the availability of suitably trained laborato-
ry staff is probably the factor that most affects the ability 
of PHLs to rapidly expand capacity. Thus, public health 
ofﬁ  cials must quickly impose appropriate triage systems 
at the beginning of public health events, such as an inﬂ  u-
enza pandemic, to ensure that existing PHL capacity is 
used effectively and wisely.
Perhaps the most important lessons in the article by 
Crawford et al. are 1) the need to continually communi-
cate to all clients and stakeholders the need for triaging 
the ﬂ  ow of clinical samples and 2) the need to explain 
how testing priorities may change over the course of a 
pandemic. Such enhanced communication, which clearly 
explains the limitations of existing laboratory capacity, 
may help build a constituency that will aid future expan-
sions of PHL capacity.
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2010  147 
Laboratory Surge Capacity 
and Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza 
Martin I. Meltzer, K. Mills McNeill, and Joseph D. Miller
Author afﬁ  liations: Associate Editor, Emerging Infectious Diseases 
journal (M.I. Meltzer, K.M. McNeill); Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (M.I. Meltzer, J.D. Miller); 
and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Kampala, Ugan-
da (K.M. McNeill)
DOI: 10.3201/eid1601.091741Dr Meltzer is a Senior Health Economist and a Distinguished 
Consultant in the Division of Emerging Infections and Surveil-
lance Services at CDC. His research interests include the model-
ing of potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon, 
examining the economics of vaccinating restaurant food handlers 
against hepatitis A, and assessing the response to pandemic in-
ﬂ  uenza.
Reference
  1.   Crawford JM, Stallone R, Zhang F, Gerolimatos M, Korologos DD, 
Sweetapple C, et al. Laboratory surge response to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 outbreak, New York City metropolitan area, USA Emerg Infect 
Dis. 2010;16:8–13.
Address for correspondence: Martin I. Meltzer, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop D59, Atlanta, GA 
30333, USA; email: mmeltzer@cdc.gov
COMMENTARY
148  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2010